Taxes Aren't Beautiful: A Singer Moves to Switzerland to Avoid British Taxes

From Taxprof/typepad.com:

"British singer-songwriter James Blunt -- best known for his hit single You're Beautiful -- has decided to establish residence in Switzerland to avoid British taxes. From press reports:
Blunt, who earned £5 million ($9.8 million) from his debut album Back To Bedlam, is the latest in a long line of high-earners to quit their homeland for Switzerland - Phil Collins resides there and French rock legend Johnny Hallyday set up residence in Gstaad only last month.
Patrick Messeiller, director of tourism for Verbier, confirmed a report in the Swiss daily Le Matin that Blunt, who is a frequent visitor to the mountain village, had registered with the tax office there.

Each Swiss canton (state) sets its own tax rates, and can cut special deals with wealthy foreigners that allow them to pay only a fraction of what they would have to pay elsewhere. "

Taxation at Casinos and Gambling

Stream, Christopher., Thompson, William. and Myers, Nathan. "Casino Taxation Rates: Politics as Unusual" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel InterContinental, New Orleans, LA, Jan 03, 2007 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p141982_index.html

Abstract: Taxes matter to business. They affect location decisions, job creation and retention, international competitiveness, and the long-term health of a state’s economy. But relatively little attention has been paid to the taxes on casinos and legalized gambling businesses. Research on gambling and casinos has largely focused on the adoption of such policy innovations in the states.

Less attention has been paid to the taxes rates on these types of firms. Among the states, the gaming tax rates vary considerably. Some states have adopted tax rates in the low teens while others collect close to 50 percent of a casino’s profits. It appears that while states with legalized gambling mimic each other in terms of the types of gaming allowed, they do not appear to follow each other in the types of rates “charged” to the casino firms. This Article examines gaming taxation rates and identifies some changes across all fifty states. We attempt to identify the factors that influenced the adoption of these tax rates in each state. We argue that state policymakers view casino taxes differently than the way they view taxes on other business firms.

These views greatly alter the politics of casino taxation in the states. The authors also provide updates on the status of gambling in several venues and suggest future research questions on the impact of gambling as an economic development tool for the states.

Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties

Philippe Bacchetta (University of Lausanne; Swiss National Bank - Study Center Gerzensee; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swiss Finance Institute) and Maria Paz Espinosa (Universidad del Pais Vasco - Department de Fundamentos del Analisis Economico) published this 2001 paper in International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2000

Here is the Abstract:

This paper examines bilateral double taxation treaties, with an emphasis on information exchange among tax authorities. A major objective is to understand which countries are more likely to sign a tax-relief treaty and when information-exchange clauses will be added to a treaty. A simple model with two asymmetric countries and repeated interactions among governments is used. The paper shows that no information exchange clause may be added to a tax treaty when there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, when there is a cost of providing information, or with one-way capital flows. It is also shown that an information clause increases the gains from a tax relief treaty, but may make it less sustainable.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=261971