lunes, 13 de octubre de 2008

Constitutional Restraints on Corporate Tax Integration

Walter Hellerstein (University of Georgia School of Law), Georg Kofler (NYU School of Law) and Ruth Mason (University of Connecticut School of Law) published the report Tax Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101560

Here is the Abstract:

States that conclude that double taxation of corporate profits unacceptably distorts the choice of business form, the debt and equity capitalization of companies, and the character and timing of profits distributions may adopt integrated corporate tax regimes, but states almost always limit such re gimes to domestic dividends¿those paid by a corporation taxable in the state to a shareholder also taxable in the state. In contrast, states generally deny double tax relief to cross-border dividends. Failure to extend relief to cross-border dividends distorts locational investment decisions.

Although restricting double tax relief to domestic dividends does not violate international tax nondiscrimination rules, more stringent nondiscrimination rules govern state taxation in the European Union and the United States. Member states of those common markets may not constitutionally prefer domestic commerce over cross-border commerce, and that constitutional constraint limits EU and U.S. states' ability to confine double tax relief to domestic dividends. This symposium paper establishes the basic framework for taxation of cross-border dividends, closely analyzes and compares constitutional challenges to states' failure to extend double tax relief to cross-border dividends in Europe and the United States, and identifies the principal policy considerations emerging from the nascent cross-border dividend jurisprudence in the European Court of Justice.

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