The Costs of International Tax Cooperation

Tsilly Dagan (Bar-Ilan University) published this 2002 article at Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-007; and U of Michigan Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13

Here is theAbstract:

This Article discusses the three levels of international tax (the unilateral, the bilateral and the multilateral). It describes the seemingly appealing arguments (based on cooperation) advocating neutrality, double taxation prevention, and harmonization. A closer look at these arguments, however, reveals that pursuing these goals often brings about completely different and sometimes undesirable results. While acknowledging the potential benefits of inter-nation cooperation for some, this article highlights the (sometimes hidden) costs of such cooperation for others. Thus, domestic interest groups tend to win or lose from adopting an (elusive) cooperative strategy as the unilateral mechanisms of their countries; developing countries tend systematically to lose tax revenue when they enter into the (more cooperative and thus seemingly benign) bilateral treaty regime; finally, the emerging multilateral regime, promoted as an all-benefiting cooperative strategy, also creates potential losers both among and within nations.

Based on this analysis, the paper argues that cooperation serves as a useful rhetorical tool that supports a certain contingent policy choice, but obscures other, potentially important, considerations and alternatives. Identifying the winners and losers of cooperative policies is necessary in order to evaluate such polices. Cooperation cannot be and is not the ultimate goal in international tax policy.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=315373 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.315373

Uncertain Taxes in China

There is a very interesting article entitled "China's Uncertain Tax Positions" posted by chinalawblog.com:

"Donald Compton of Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP just had published a nice introduction to some of the tax issues likely to confront multinational companies doing business in China. The article is entitled, "China: Determining Uncertain Tax Positions In China," [free subscription may be required] and its focus is on what such companies need to do to comply with Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48.

The introduction to the article nicely summarizes the article itself:
By now many multinational companies have begun the process of addressing how Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 ("FIN 48") will apply to their global business. The challenge in understanding the FIN 48 implications for tax planning and local country compliance issues in foreign jurisdictions will be significant. FIN 48 requires companies to ascertain, evaluate, and conclude on discrete tax risks. Companies must not only account for the interest and penalties on these conclusions, but must also adhere to a new disclosure regime.

Companies may not have the wherewithal to fully appreciate the implications of their tax posture due to many factors, including lack of knowledge, time constraints, resource constraints, quality of the past compliance filings, and insufficient mechanisms to gather data. Many issues, including documentation, transfer pricing, arbitrary enforcement and inconsistent interpretation by regulators, are common in many jurisdictions, although each jurisdiction may have its own particular twist.
For companies operating in China, the tax planning environment creates another level of complex Uncertain Tax Positions ("UTPs") analysis. This complexity arises because many companies have negotiated at the provincial and local levels to reduce the national statutory rate, plus there are numerous local incentive regimes. This article provides the author's perspective on UTPs in China and suggests some areas that companies currently or potentially operating in China should consider."

Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage

Professor Adam H. Rosenzweig (from Washington University) has postes Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 555 (2007). Here is the abstract:

The issue of international tax arbitrage has proven a difficult and intractable one. Rather than try to minimize costs of the arbitrage or prevent “abuse” of the laws of a particular regime, the United States should also consider affirmatively bearing some of the costs of the international tax arbitrage transaction to further the policy of international vertical equity and shift the incentives in the worldwide regime that led to the rise of the arbitrage in the first place.

Harnessing the costs of international tax arbitrage transactions will not always be the appropriate response to each particular arbitrage transaction. Depending on the circumstances, the traditional responses may be sufficient, a fundamental change to the underlying United States domestic tax law may be appropriate or a worldwide consensus on harmonization in a particular area may arise. Harnessing the costs of the international tax arbitrage should be considered, however, when such responses prove inadequate. At a minimum, in adopting such an approach the United States would provide some level of subsidy for investment in developing countries at little to no cost to the current international tax regime. At best, however, harnessing the costs of international tax arbitrage could place of the issue of international tax arbitrage back on the international scene, restart stalled international tax discussions and potentially move towards a greater worldwide consensus, not only on the international tax arbitrage itself but on the larger issue of the role of international vertical equity in the worldwide tax regime. In a second-best world, United States unilateral action in harnessing the costs of international tax arbitrage may be the first step towards a first-best solution.

IBM under the wire tax break

Big Blue’s Under-the-Wire Tax Break
Posted by Peter Lattman, from http://blogs.wsj.com/

It looks like IBM’s tax lawyers are earning their keep. Just two days after they used a complex corporate tax loophole to save an estimated $1.6 billion, the IRS moved to close the loophole down. Here are stories from the WSJ and NYT.

On May 29, IBM said it had structured a $12.5 billion stock repurchase to take advantage of overseas earnings without making them subject to stiff U.S. corporate tax rates. Because they’re designed to make an end around IRS section 367(B) covering U.S. taxes on repatriated earnings, tax lawyers call these deals “Killer B” transactions.

Two days later, the IRS announced plans to issue regulations making companies pay U.S. taxes when they buy back their stock, even if the shares are purchased by an international subsidiary. It said the planned ban on the practice would take effect that day.

Stewart Lipeles, a tax attorney with Baker & McKenzie, told the WSJ it looked like the IRS rushed out a notice after it caught wind of IBM’s “Killer B.” The IRS won’t say.

Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting

Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting – Evidence from Company-Level Data
Thiess Buettner (Ifo Institute for Economic Research and CESifo) and Georg Wamser (Ifo Institute for Economic Research) published this paper on March 2007 at CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1959.

Here is the Abstract:

This paper is concerned with tax-planning strategies of multinational corporations. A theoretical analysis discusses the choice of the capital structure in a setting where intercompany loans can be used to shift profits to low-tax countries. Empirical evidence is provided using micro-level panel data of virtually all German multinationals made available by the Bundesbank. This comprehensive dataset allows us to exploit differences in taxing conditions of almost eighty countries during a period of nine years.

The empirical results confirm a robust impact of tax-rate differences within the multinational group on the use of intercompany loans, supporting the profit-shifting hypothesis. However, the implied tax-revenue effects are rather small, suggesting that costs related to adjusting the capital structure for profit-shifting purposes are substantial.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=981120

Which Countries Become Tax Havens?

Which Countries Become Tax Havens?
Dhammika Dharmapala (University of Connecticut) and James R. Hines Jr. (University of Michigan) published this paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in December 2006.

Here is the Abstract:

This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether countries become tax havens. Roughly 15 percent of countries are tax havens; as has been widely observed, these countries tend to be small and affluent. This paper documents another robust empirical regularity: better-governed countries are much more likely than others to become tax havens. Using a variety of empirical approaches, and controlling for other relevant factors, governance quality has a statistically significant and quantitatively large impact on the probability of being a tax haven. For a typical country with a population under one million, the likelihood of a becoming a tax haven rises from 24 percent to 63 percent as governance quality improves from the level of Brazil to that of Portugal.

The effect of governance on tax haven status persists when the origin of a country's legal system is used as an instrument for its quality of its governance. Low tax rates offer much more powerful inducements to foreign investment in well-governed countries than elsewhere, which may explain why poorly governed countries do not generally attempt to become tax havens - and suggests that the range of sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of governance.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=952721

Mason on Tax Discrimination in the EU

Proffessor Ruth Mason (UConn) has published an interesting report entitled In Search of Internal Consistency: Tax Discrimination in the EU, 46 Colum. J. Trans. L ___ (2007), on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The European Union was created to bind the countries of Europe together economically to prevent future wars. Rigorous enforcement of EU nationals' fundamental economic freedoms before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has furthered economic integration. The fundamental freedoms prohibit tax discrimination—harsher tax treatment of cross-border economic activities than purely internal activities. Critics of the ECJ argue that the Court's broad interpretation of the EC freedoms causes it to find tax discrimination where there is none. This tendency encroaches upon the sovereignty of EU member states and hampers their ability to pursue economic policy goals. In contrast, based upon a survey of all the ECJ's tax discrimination decisions, this Article offers a more nuanced critique that shows the ECJ's errors in tax discrimination cases go in both directions. In addition to finding discrimination where there is none, the Court also sometimes fails to recognize discrimination. The Court's failure to recognize tax discrimination undermines the economic integration of Europe and abridges EU nationals' personal rights.

This Article is the first to identify the Court's method of review in tax discrimination cases, the comparable internal situation test (CIST), as a principal contributor to the Court's difficulty in tax cases. Instead of CIST, the Article proposes that the ECJ borrow a method developed by the U.S. Supreme Court for tax cases arising under the Commerce Clause: the internal consistency test (ICT). Adoption of this simpler method should enable the ECJ to make more coherent tax decisions, which will promote economic efficiency and integration of the European common market.