Regulating Tax Competition in Offshore Financial Centers

Regulating Tax Competition in Offshore Financial Centers

Craig M. Boise (Case Western Reserve University - School of Law) published this paper at Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-26

Here is the Abstract:

One of the more entrenched issues in international taxation over the last thirty years has been how to define and respond appropriately to harmful tax competition among nations, especially competition from offshore financial centers (OFCs). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) have both mounted initiatives seeking to regulate such competition, and OFCs have strongly objected to these initiatives as an abrogation of their sovereignty in tax matters. This paper provides an introduction to the debate over the regulation of international tax competition, beginning with an overview of the essential architecture of international taxation and the way that its structure creates problems for developed countries and opportunities for OFCs, and continuing with an assessment of the arguments asserted in favor of, and against, regulating tax competition.

The paper then examines how developed countries, through the OECD and EU, have defined international tax competition, and the efforts made by both organizations to regulate such competition. Finally, the paper draws on the way the OECD and EU dealt specifically with the twin touchstones of virtually all definitions of tax havens-low or no income taxation and bank secrecy-to suggest the direction that regulation of tax competition is likely to take in the future.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266329

Did Blacklisting Hurt the Tax Havens?

Did Blacklisting Hurt the Tax Havens?

Robert T. Kudrle (University of Minnesota) publish this paper atPaolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2008-23

Here is the Abstract:

Purpose - This paper tests the widely-held assumption that blacklisting, such as that practiced by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), affects the volume of financial activity associated with a tax haven.

Design/Methodology/Approach - ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) analysis is used to explore changes across eight measures of in banking-associated activity that occurred when a tax haven was placed on, or removed from, one FATF and two OECD blacklists.

Findings - The results are highly varied. Most importantly, no substantial and consistent impact of blacklisting on banking investment in and out of the tax havens was found across 38 jurisdictions.

Practical implications - The role of "speech acts" - unconnected with other developments in the havens or foreign policy measures beyond rhetoric - may not be as important for tax haven investment as previously thought.

Originality/Value - No rigorous and comprehensive study has previously been done of this important question.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1243695

Institutional Culture, Actor Interests, and Tax Cooperation in the OECD, IMF and United Nations

Webb, Michael. "Institutional Culture, Actor Interests, and Tax Cooperation in the OECD, IMF and United Nations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Abstract: The OECD is the most prominent and most widely studied international institution in international tax diplomacy, but it is not the only one. This paper compares the approaches taken by the OECD, the IMF, and the United Nations to international taxation, particularly corporate taxation and developing countries.

The IMF provides so-called "technical assistance" on taxation to developing countries, assistance that is heavily influenced by tax theory developed by academic economists and that helps constitute states and state-society relations in developing countries. Various agencies within the UN have developed a Model Tax
Treaty that is more favorable to developing countries than the OECD Model, and they providetechnical and diplomatic assistance to developing countries on tax issues. The paper argues that some similarities and differences in the approaches taken by these institutions can be accounted for by the interests of their memberstates (which in turn are shaped by societal interests, especially those of transnational taxpayers), but that the culture, norms and traditions of the institutions also matter.

Did the OECD Attack on Tax Havens Have Measurable Effects?"

Kudrle, Robert. "Did the OECD Attack on Tax Havens Have Measurable Effects?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007


Abstract: The 1998 OECD Report, Harmful Tax Competition, essentially declared war on jurisdictions with practices that most member governments regarded as abusive. The declaration was followed by a set of actions that many have viewed as severely undermining the credibly of the organization with friends and foes alike. The negative reactions of the largely small and weak states classified as ?tax havens? caused a rethinking and a change of tactics within the OECD. This resulted in a rather abrupt change in approach: the replacement of unilateral demands by a kinder, gentler cooperative approach that created the impression for many that the OECD was incompetent, weak, or both. This paper will employ interrupted time series data analysis of tax haven activity to evaluate claims about the effectiveness of the project in changing the location and volume of international investment and the implied changes of tax revenue by other states.

A Level Playing Field and the Space for Small States

Vlcek, William. "A Level Playing Field and the Space for Small States" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007

Abstract: In the course of producing a project against tax competition, the OECD has insisted on the establishment of a level playing field. The subjects of this project are predominantly small states with offshore financial centres and few alternatives available to achieve economic development. This paper reflects upon the broad parameters of the OECD's concern with tax competition and its proposed method to resolve the issue.

The following argument is an interrogation of the meaning embedded within the term 'level playing field' as used in the debate over international tax competition. It outlines some of the broad consequences that an OECD success with implementing the project holds for small economies. The conclusion reached is that a level playing field in the global political economy is a mirage with more substance for some states than for others.

International VAT/GST Guidelines

Interesting Guidelines by the OCDE: http://www.law.uconn.edu/news/events/itax/vat.pdf

The world (Tax) is Flat

There is an interesting editorial in the Wall Street Journal, The World is Flat:

"Sooner or later it had to happen: The mainstream press is finally discovering the flat-tax movement that has been sweeping Europe. It must be painful to credit an idea associated with the likes of Milton Friedman and Steve Forbes, but reality can't be ignored forever.

The latest news is that the government of Greece is contemplating a 25% flat-rate income tax to take effect in 2006, replacing a multiple-tier tax structure with rates of 40% or more. The Finance Minister insists that such a flat-tax reform is necessary to reduce a spiraling budget deficit, and that any lost revenue will be recouped "via an overall increase in income."

By our count, this brings to 11 the number of nations with a single-rate, postcard tax system. More dominoes are expected to fall in the next few years: Bulgaria, Croatia and Hungary are also preparing to feed their thousands of pages of tax code into the shredder in favor of lower, flatter rates. A flat-tax proposal was debated as part of Poland's recent election campaign. And one of the countries that started it all, Estonia, plans to lower its rate one more time, to 20% from 24%, which was down from the initial flat rate of 26%. Lithuania hopes to go to 24% from 33%.

As shown in the nearby table, most of the world's flat-tax nations today are the former Iron Curtain nations, which for 50 years attempted to create a workers' paradise through command-and-control economic systems. Many of these nations have swung full circle in the opposite, free-enterprise direction. Daniel Mitchell, chief economist at the Heritage Foundation, notes that Greece's decision would make it the first non-former communist European nation to adopt the flat tax. East Europe is exporting its economic system westward after all, but not in the way Nikita Khrushchev ever could have imagined.

In response, even Old Europe has had to consider tax reform, lest its economies become increasingly uncompetitive. Rather than catching the flat-tax wave, France, Germany and Italy have been attempting to stop it by outlawing tax competition through international entities, such as the OECD, the European Union and United Nations.

But in the meantime, Germany has decided it can't wait and has announced plans to cut its corporate tax rate to 19% from 25%. During last month's election campaign, the opposition party's candidate for finance minister, Paul Kirchhof, championed a 25% flat tax "so that workers don't need 12 Saturdays but 10 minutes to complete their taxes." Some analysts blame the proposal for the opposition's late collapse in the polls, as incumbent Gerhard Schröder's party fanned fears about the flat tax. But the fact that it was debated at all shows that even Germans realize they are under competitive tax pressure.

And what of the United States? The postcard flat-tax concept was virtually invented on these shores, originally by Mr. Friedman. Americans devised the economically optimal tax system and much of the world seems ready to embrace it -- just not us.

Back in the 1980s, a few Democrats (Bill Bradley, Dick Gephardt) entertained a tax reform of flatter rates and fewer deductions. But nowadays the political left derides the concept as some sinister plot to let Rolls Royce and yacht owners slash their tax bills. Their ideological blinders prevent them from learning the lesson that the new political class in Russia, Estonia and now Greece accept as a 21st-century economic reality: The best way to get more taxes out of rich people is to generate more rich people, and then give them more incentive to report their income by keeping tax rates low.

Russia, for example, has reported that it now gets more tax revenues from the rich from its 13% flat tax than from its pre-existing Swiss cheese tax code with massive evasion and 50%-plus tax rates. Russia's revenues with the flat tax grew in real terms by 28% in 2001, 21% in 2002, and 31% in 2003, according to a recent analysis by the Hoover Institution. If the U.S. had that kind of revenue growth, our politicians would be wringing their hands over what to do with budget surpluses.

Last year the Internal Revenue code achieved a new Olympic record for complexity, with nine million words -- 12 times the length of the King James Bible. High tax rates and mindless tax complexity are an economic ball and chain. We hope President Bush's tax reform commission will cut through the class-warfare blather later this month and endorse a simple, broad-based, single-rate tax system."

The WSJ published a table showing the flat tax rates in these eleven countries. I have added below the 2004 GDP growth rates in these countries, which usually exceeds the worldwide growth rate of major industrialized countries:

Flat Tax Rates and GDP Growth Rates
Country Flat Tax Rate GDP Growth Rate
Estonia 24% 4.8%
Georgia 12% 5.5%
Greece 25% 4.0%
Hong Kong 16% 2.9%
Latvia 25% 6.8%
Lithuania 33% 7.1%
Romania 16% 4.5%
Russia 13% 7.3%
Serbia 14% 2.0%
Slovakia 19% 3.9%
Ukraine 13% 8.2%
October 8, 2005 in News | Permalink